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DEVELOPING AFRICA: THE SHRINKING U.S. SHARE 
In recent years, overall U.S. foreign assistance has declined steadily as a percentage of the U.S. gross national product (GNP). The 
precipitous reduction in official development assistance (ODA) is generally attributed to several factors: deteriorating domestic and 
global economic conditions; the rise of fiscal conservatism in the U.S.; a retreat by the American public from foreign involvements; and · 
a significant political indifference on the part of influential senior levels of government. Following years of generous giving to the "have-
nots" of the world, the U.S. has slipped to the lower rungs of the ladder among Western aid-donor nations. Critics of America's foreign 
aid program have marshalled an impressive arsenal of arguments for further circumscribing the Agency for International Development 
(USA/DJ, America's vehicle for bilateral assistance. Reagan administration policy planners have mounted a sustained drive to inhibit the 
role of the World Bank by limiting the amounts of replenishments to Bank affiliates such as the International Development Association 
(IDA). Moreover, the administration and the Congress have joined to slash assistance levels to multinational agencies such as the African 
Development Bank Fund. As always, Africa remains low continent on the totem pole in the annual U.S. foreign aid a/locations. Why this 
continues to be so is the subject recently explored in the following interview TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, Randall Robinson 
conducted with Howard Wolpe (D.-Mich.), Chairman of the House International Relations Sub-committee on Africa. □ 
The U.S. has now slipped into thirteenth place in the 
world in terms of foreign assistance as a percentage of 
the Gross National Product (GNP). What will be the 
cost of this decline both for the poor countries of the 
world and for U.S. interests abroad? 
WOLPE: It's extremely unfortunate that U.S. assis-
tance as a percentage of the GNP is falling precisely at a 
time when the needs of most developing states, particu-
larly those of Africa, are facing some of their most diffi-
cult economic and political problems. These cuts in 
American assistance are coming at the very moment in 
which American interests are much more extensive in 
Third World countries and in which we have a much 
greater dependence upon Third World cooperation in 
international forums and in the economic sphere. 
The costs of the United States failure to participate 
adequately in the effort to provide assistance to African 
states and to the Third World generally are, in my view, 
extensive. First, throughout much of the Third World, 
particularly in Africa, the source of civil strife, political 
instability, and military coups can be traced directly to 
the social inequities which result from slow economic 
growth and from poor economic performance. I think 
two recent examples of coups in Liberia and Ghana 
illustrate that phenomenom. In both of those countries, 
deteriorating economic conditions combined with cor-
ruption led to the fall of those governments. Economic 
assistance-if directed properly and given in reasonable 
amounts-can really help provide the conditions for 
economic take-off and for greater political stability. 
Second, there's an additional cost to America. As the 
richest nation in the world, our own credibiltiy is severe-
Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) 
THE SUPREME IRONY IS THAT THIS PRESENT 
ADMINISTRATION SEES ITSELF AS UNIQUELY 
HARDHEADED AND UNIQUELY ORIENTED 
TOW ARD STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS IN THE 
FORMULATION OF ITS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM . ... THE END RESULT [OF ITS POLI-
CIES] IS FREQUENTLY LESS ST ABILITY 
RATHER THAN MORE ST ABILITY AND LESS SE-
CURITY RATHER THAN MORE SECURITY. 
ly damaged if we do not participate in a manner that's 
commensurate with our resources in the effort to pro-
vide adequate amounts of assistance. It's not just a 
question of prestige; it's also a question of.direct, inter-
dependent economic interests. If Third World states do 
not begin to perform more effectively within an eco-
nomic arena, then our own ability to expand our export 
markets will be severely hampered . We have our own 
self-interest in sharing economic growth and develop-
ment of the Third World. As part of the same point, our 
own dependence upon critical minerals and upon 
petroleum from Third World states means that we have 
to be concerned with conditions of civil unrest within 
these states that can lead to an interruption of our access 
to critical supplies. So, our own self-interest is directly 
tied up in the success of Third World economic develop-
ment initiatives. 
Since the end of World War II, U.S. foreign assistance 
has declined precipitously at the same time that the per-
centage of military assistance has grown. How do you 
explain a policy that decreases development spending 
while increasing military spending? 
WOLPE : I think it's based on an abysmal lack of 
understanding of the politics, the internal dynamics, of 
developing nations. The supreme irony is that this pres-
ent administration sees itself as uniquely hardheaded 
and uniquely oriented toward strategic calculations in 
the formulation of its foreign assistance program. The 
real irony is that when they define the political stability 
within developing states as being determined primarily 
by the levels of military support that flows to current 
regimes, they are intentionally taking an initiative that is 
directly counterproductive to their own goal of enhanc-
ing the stability of these states because military as-
sistance that flows to these governments frequently re-
quires an increase in the debt burden that these states 
carry. It represents an enormous diversion of resources 
within these countries from the economic, social and 
political problems they face at home into the military 
sphere. So, the end product is frequently less stability 
rather than more stability and less security rather than 
more security. America's own interests are compro-
mised together with those of the states that are recipi-
ents of our increased military assistance. 
How would you characterize the Reagan administra-
tion's approach to the linkage between the U.S. stra-
tegic objectives and foreign assistance? 
WOLPE: First the administration has given a higher 
priority to providing military and security-related assis-
tance rather than economic aid to African states. In the 
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past two years, the administration's requests for foreign 
military sales credits have climbed by over 300 percent. 
In that same period, the level of security-related assis-
tance (ESF) has climbed by 200 percent. This is in the 
wake of declines in development aid and Africa's 
mounting economic problems. 
Second, American assistance is being concentrated in 
areas where the U.S. is perceived to have strategic inter-
ests, not necessarily in the poorest and neediest regions 
of the continent. Thus, Sudan is being given over $200 
million in assistance, nearly one-fifth of all of Africa's 
aid because of its support of our Middle East policy. 
Kenya and Somalia are receiving large aid packages be-
cause they signed facilities agreements with us two years 
ago and now allow American naval ships to use their 
ports. We are also stepping up our aid levels and intro-
ducing new military and security-related assistance pro-
grams to a host of moderate African states that tend to 
follow our western leads in international organizations . 
Meanwhile, the poor get poorer. States which are per-
ceived to be Soviet stooges are eliminated from our pro-
gram or get cutbacks. The administration refuses, for 
example , to aid Mozambique or to send an American 
Ambassador to that country. Our aid program in 
Ethiopia remains closed, and we have no Ambassador. 
Of course, we continue not to have formal diplomatic 
ties with Angola. 
How should U.S. policy toward foreign assistance be 
changed? 
WOLPE: We should increase economic assistance to 
Africa to encourage greater development efforts by 
African governments themselves. We have an economic 
interest in increased trade and a political interest in in-
creased political stability arising from more economic 
progress in Africa. 
In addition to the North-South perspective, we should 
avoid injecting an East-West perspective by granting aid 
to countries like Mozambique and Angola because our 
interest lies in their improved relations with the U.S. 
Human rights considerations should be important as 
we relate not just to a government but to its people, and 
the latter is in the long-term interests of the United 
States. Thus, we should limit military aid to Zaire and 
refuse to aid segregated educational and other institu-
tions in South Africa . 
To the extent we feel we need to give balance of pay-
ments or budgetary aid, rather than specific develop-
ment aid, we should seek to concentrate the former as-
sistance on regions and sectors vital for development, 
e.g. spare parts imports for agricultural cooperatives in 
the rural areas rather than a high technology factory 
making clothes for the elite. 
In economic aid, we should focus more on aid to in-
digenous local development organizations like coopera-
tives, housing agencies, artisans, and village organiza-
tions in order to spur self-sustaining development 
progress. 
Finally, we must decrease proposed levels of military 
aid, as we have done by well over $100 million in our 
Subcommittee. Africa, by and large, does not face ma-
jor external threats, and where it does (e.g. southern 
Africa) our diplomacy, is by far, the most important 
contribution we can make to regional peace. □ 
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: 
HOW DOES U.S. FOREIGN AID MEASURE UP? 
The United States has always taken pride in telling the 
world that it is the best-"Number l "-in countless 
fields . It was the first nation to land men on the moon. 
Until recently, it was unquestionably number one in 
military weapon superiority. And yet, as a donor of eco-
nomic aid to developing countries, it has now fallen to 
thirteenth place. Although the United States has the 
largest aid program in terms of absolute dollar 
amounts, it has dropped nearly to the bottom of the list 
of aid-donor countries on the basis of assistance as a 
percentage of GNP . According to AID's Congressional 
Presentation: FY 1983, the U.S., which donates .27 per-
cent of GNP, now ranks below: 
• the Netherlands (.99%) • Australia (.480Jo) 
• Norway (.82%) • Germany (.43%) 
• Sweden (.76%) • Canada (.42%) 
• Denmark (.72%) • United Kingdom (.34%) 
• France (.62%) • Japan (.32%) 
• Belgium (.49%) • New Zealand (.32%) 
Of the Western aid-donor countries, only Switzerland, 







Table 1. U.S. ODA IN COMPARISON WITH 
ALL OTHER DAC COUNTRIES, 1965- 1980 
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Source: Overseas Development Council, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World, Agenda 
1982, p. 244. 
As Table 1 illustrates, while official development aid 
from other advanced nations has been rising in real 
terms over the last fifteen years, U.S. aid has not been 
keeping up with inflation. It is ironic that according to 
the Overseas Development Council citizens of the U.S. 
spent one billion more on being groomed and more than 
six times as much on alcohol consumption than the U.S. 
spent on overseas development assistance in 1980. If the 
U.S. continues to ignore its interdependency, it may 
prove to be disastrous not only for the developing world 
but also for U.S. political and economic interests. D 
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: 
WHAT IS THE U.S. GIVING TO AFRICA? 
Of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world, 
eighteen are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the last 
decade, the economic performance in these countries 
has seriously declined. Food production has declined by 
fifteen percent. Average annual growth in per capita 
GNP is projected between one percent and negative one-
tenth of a percent between 1980 and 1990. 
Nevertheless, the urgency of this situation is nrJt re-
flected in the level of direct foreign assistance which the 
United States is providing developing countries in 
Africa. 
Rather than increasing aid to meet the tremendous 
needs of these countries, development asistance to Afri-
ca will fall from $327. 5 million in FY 1982 to $323 .4 
million in FY 1983 despite the critical situation that is 
developing throughout the continent. PL-480 food aid 
to Africa has dropped about fifty percent since 1980. 
Table 2. TOTAL ECONOMIC AND 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
Fiscal Year 1983 
Near East and 
South Asia 
Europe 
59.64 15.33 10.12 8.37 6.55 
Source: U.S. State Department, Foreign Assistance; Congressional Presentaiton, FY 1983. 
In a letter to the Congress, Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig promised, "support for the development ef-
forts of nations important to the U,S. and Western in-
terests." Helping to meet Africa's most basic develop-
ment needs, therefore, must not be important to this 
administration. 
The low priority accorded to Africa is most starkly re-
flected in a comparison of the distribution of foreign as-
sistance dollars. Africa receives substantially fewer dol-
lars than do other less needy regions of the world. 
Europe receives a greater share of total economic and 
military assistance dollars than does Africa. While the 
Near East and South Asia region receives nearly sixty 
percent of these funds, Africa receives a little more than 
ten percent (See Table 2). As Congressman Lee Hamil-
ton has argued, the U.S. has turned the foreign assis-
tance program into a mechanism for helping two coun-
tries-Egypt and Israel. In this context , Africa's press-
ing needs remain unmet. 
It is obvious that changes in the distribution of for-
eign assistance are sorely needed. This country needs to 
re-think its priorities. And it needs to do so 
immediately. D 
REAGAN WATCH: THE WORLD BANK "AMBUSHED . .. IN THE PASS" 
"Unfortunately, . . . Ronald Reagan came along 
with his knife out for the World Bank and other in-
ternational development banks. [World Bank 
President] Clausen is trying to adjust to the needs 
of the new era, but the administration is doing 
everything it can to undermine him." 
Henry S. Reuss (Dem.-Wis .), Chairman 
Joint Economic Committee of Congress 
The Reagan administration's policy toward foreign 
aid is clear. They propose: less public aid, more reliance 
on the private sector, a focus on security concerns, and 
a preference for bilateral aid over multilateral aid . This 
last concern has resulted in major change in U.S. policy 
toward the World Bank and other multilateral develop-
ment banks. They have, as John Sewell, President of the 
Overseas Development Council said, "ambushed 
[World Bank President] Clausen in the pass." 
The Reagan administration has had a negative atti-
tude toward multilateral assistance from the beginning. 
The Republican platform opposes it : the conservative 
wing of the party equates it with "one-worldism" and a 
loss of control over how U.S. tax dollars are spent. 
Reagan himself argued against it during his campaign. 
After the election , 0MB Director David Stockman's 
now famous "black book cuts" also entailed substantial 
cuts in multilateral assistance. 0MB took the position 
that replenishments agreed to by previous U.S. adminis-
trations should be renegotiated and that U.S. contribu-
tions to the World Bank should be reduced . In practice, 
this would mean that the overall replenishments would 
be sharply reduced because the U.S. would try to keep 
up its percentage share-and thereby its percentage of 
the vote-by prevailing upon other donors to reduce 
their contributions as well. 
Consequently, the U.S . Treasury Department negoti-
ated with the Bank to stretch out the U .S. contribution 
to the sixth replenishment of the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), the World Bank's soft loan 
window, cutting $400 million this year from its con-
tribution. Though committed to provide $1.08 billion, 
the U.S. has provided just $700 million. 
The administration, accusing multilateral institutions 
of "financing socialism" in an interview given by 
Undersecretary of Treasury Beryl Sprinkel, announced 
that Treasury would undertake a major study of the 
U.S. role in the banks. The report, United States Par-
ticipation in Multilateral Development Banks in the 
1980's, issued in February 1982, recommended that: 
• the bank slow and eventua lly stop expansion of its 
lending, 
• the bank move aggres~ively to "graduate" coun-
tries from bank fi nancing 10 private lending, and 
• the U.S . impose severe limits on its fut ure contribu-
tions to the IDA. 
The implication of these recommendations is that the 
Reagan administration's policy will have its most 
devastating impact on the " poorest of the poor." These 
countries have come to depend upon the highly conces-
sional interest rates provided them through the IDA's 
"soft loan windows" to finance necessary projects in 
areas such as road and power plant construction and to 
meet the most basic human needs of their populations. 
The Reagan administration's cuts, however, will mean 
that far fewer of these loans will be made. The adminis-
tration negotiated a U.S. share of $150 million in the 
replenishment of the African Development Fund, a 
reduction from 16.5 to 14.2 percent. This soft loan win-
do-N, concentrating heavily on agriculture, serves the 
very poorest countries in Africa . 
Both current World Bank President Clausen and 
former President McNamara have been extremely criti-
cal of the administration's policies. "We must provide 
additional resources for countries where the need is 
greatest," says Clausen. The IDA is "not the Robin 
Hood of the international financial set, nor the United 
Way of the development community,'' he adds. 
Mr. McNamara gives the Reagan administration 
"very low marks" for its policy toward assistance to 
low income countries. "We're leading to the rear," he 
argues, "at a time when the U.S. shou ld be giving 
strong positive direction to international assistance ef-
forts." The decision to cut, rather than to increase, con-
tributions to multilateral institutions is "contrary to 
U .S. national interests." 
As it takes away vital contributions to development 
assistance, the Reagan administration offers instead the 
"magic of the market place" with little or no considera-
tion for what that may mean to the poorest countries in 
Africa . Reagan reminds these countries that they must 
"put [their] own financial and economic houses in 
order" without substantial help from the U.S. 
But such a strategy has little likelihood of success in 
these countries, even if they are able to bear the tremen-
dous costs which must be borne. First, the problems are 
monumental: rising energy costs, world-wide inflation, 
and the reduction in foreign assistance from both the 
U.S . and other quarters has left these countries with 
staggering debt burdens which these nations cannot rea-
sonably be expected to pay back within one or two gen-
erations . Second, it is highly improbable that foreign in-
vestment will take up the slack. T hese countries are not 
the most attractive for multinational investment. As 
McNamara reminded the administration, "l don't have 
$1 of my private funds invested in Bangladesh"-or in 
Upper Volta or Mali for that matter. Third, as the exter-
nal financing needs of these countries grow, they face 
economic collapse, increasing poverty, unrest, and mas-
sive migrations. The Reagan administration will have to 
re-think its policies or suffer the unfortunate conse-
quences directly attributable to severe global economic 
upheaval. □ 
PROFILE ON PEOPLE: C. PAYNE LUCAS OF AFRICARE 
C. Payne Lucas 
When you mention "development in Africa" to most 
Americans, one person comes easily to mind: C. Payne 
Lucas, the Executive Director of Africare, a private 
voluntary organization (PYO) based in Washington and 
working throughout Africa. 
Born in the tiny town of Springs Hope, North 
Carolina in 1933, C. Payne Lucas had no idea that he 
would grow up to form a lifelong commitment to the 
African continent. Following his graduation from the 
University of Maryland (Eastern Shore), post-graduate 
study at American University, and service in the Air 
Force, Lucas, after a short stint at the Defense Depart-
ment, took a position with the then newly-formed Peace 
Corps, under Sargeant Shriver, in 1962. His hunger to 
explore the world was fulfilled when he was sent to the 
small West African nation of Togo to help run that 
country's Peace Corps program. "First," he recalls, "I 
had to find Togo on the map. I went with all these reser-
vations, thinking of ... the heat and the 'primitive' 
people. When I got there, my first assessment was ... 
we really have been hoodwinked .... The people are 
divine, the culture's wonderful, and I love the food!" 
Five years of successful work with the Peace Corps, 
mostly in Africa, earned Lucas the coveted "President 
of the United States Award for Distinguished Federal 
Civilian Service" in 1967 and a commendation from 
President Johnson labeling him a "modern pioneer." In 
1971, as a result of a close relationship with Niger's 
then-President Hamani Diori, Lucas was urged to take 
over a faltering private medical relief effort based in 
Niger's capital, Niamey. "Even though I loved [Diori] 
dearly," Lucas recounts, "I couldn't visualize leaving a 
GS-18 job and taking on a non-profit organization that 
didn't have a quarter." But, he did just that and has 
been the mainstay of Africare for ten years. 
Africare is unique in the international PYO com-
munity in that its individual contributions come chiefly 
from black Americans. Lucas sees this black community 
effort as important in dispelling the widely-held notion 
that blacks do not give financial assistance to "their" 
institutions . Today, he notes, "sixty-five percent of our 
individual donors are black-and that's really impres-
sive." This kind of grassroots support, along with 
foundation , corporate, and U.S. government contribu-
tors, has moved Africare into the forefront of 
America's economic assistance to Africa. With a 
1982-1983 budget in excess of $6 million, over thirty 
Africare projects are now in operation across Africa, 
supervised by six Africare field offices. 
While currently focusing on problems relating to 
water, food, health, emergency refugee assistance, and 
rural development, Africare in the near future also 
plans to embark upon economic joint ventures with 
American and African commercial interests. The soar-· 
ing price tag of development in rural Africa (a well that 
cost $5,000 in 1972 now has a $20,000 price tag), has led 
Lucas and Africare to re-evaluate the basic re-
quirements heretofore considered essential to the 
development process. 
Having felt in tune with USAID's "basic human 
needs strategy" that evolved in the mid-1970's, Lucas 
now shares a critical perception with other development 
analysts in suggesting that "It's not worth much to in-
crease the productivity of a farmer [who] does not have 
the rural road to get his produce to market. There are 
simply some major infrastructural problems in Africa 
... that have to be addressed at the same time as ... 
basic human needs." One way to approach this issue, 
Lucas argues, is to extend U.S. bilateral support to in-
frastructural projects while at the same time increasing 
U.S. funding to the multilateral development and lend-
ng institutions. While pleased that the Congress has 
mandated sixteen percent of all official development 
assistance to flow through American PYO's, Lucas 
acknowledges that the PYO role is likely to remain 
limited to smaller and medium-range projects due to 
funding limitations. Unless donor governments, there-
fore, including the U.S., increase bilateral ODA flows 
to the building of infrastructure, Africa is surely to fall 
further behind in the race for economic survival. 
Africa's additional burden of millions of refugees and 
displaced persons has only complicated that develop-
ment process. Lucas notes that while U.S. assistance to 
African refugees has indeed seen an increase this year, it 
pales in comparison to assistance extended to southeast 
Asian refugees. 
And yet, even in the short term, Lucas, a "can-do" 
optimist, sees both political and economic advancement 
in Africa. There are no "basket-case" phrases in his 
vocabulary. Africa has the cultural ethos, mineral and 
agricultural resources, and human capabilities, he 
believes, to work itself out of its current situation and to 
become the continent of the future. Africare will con-
tinue its mission because its definition of development 
embraces more than the technological. 
Africare's commitment also extends to changing 
American misconceptions about both Africa and devel-
opment assistance in a number of ways by helping the 
American public to understand that foreign aid is not a 
"giveaway" and by reminding them that about one in 
every seven American jobs results directly from U.S. 
foreign assistance, trade, and investment. 
In Lucas' words, "When you end foreign aid and for-
eign trade, you are taking bread out of American 
mouths, and you are interrupting a dynamic and mu-
tually beneficial progression into the future ." In the 
coming years, Africare confidently expects to ac-
complish its current agenda-and much more. □ 
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